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Abstract. This paper evaluates performance differences between government owned, mixed
sector and private sector enterprises in India for the period 1973–1974 to 1988–1989. The
results establish that enterprises owned by the central government and state governments are
less efficient than mixed or private sector enterprises, while mixed sector enterprises are less
efficient than those in the private sector. The results contradict extant evidence finding no
performance differences between government-owned and private firms in India. There have,
however, been inter-temporal efficiency gains for the sector as a whole, perhaps resulting from
reforms undertaken towards improving government-owned enterprises’ performance.
1. Introduction
Considerable disquiet about the performance of the government-owned sec-
tor of Indian industry has been expressed by writers who have been senior
policy-makers (Bhoothalingam, 1993; Jalan, 1991; Marathe, 1989) and aca-
demics (Bardhan, 1984; Bhagwati, 1993). Yet, extant comparative evidence
(Bhaya, 1990; Jha and Sahni, 1992; Ramaswamy and Renforth, 1994) points
to no significant differences in the performance of private versus state-owned
firms. What is the true picture? If the Indian government-owned sector is as
efficient as the private sector, then the large amount of effort being current-
ly devoted to privatization and reforms is of no avail, since the efficiency
gains are unlikely to be material.1 Conversely, the authors expressing disqui-
et may have substantive reasons for doing so, and contemporary empirical
research could be flawed. The resolution of such a conundrum, then, has to
be based on evidence, and this paper reports the results of a study evaluating
comparative efficiency patterns among segments of Indian industry owned
by different categories of investors.2
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Comparative efficiency assessment is also important for another reason.
Research shows that the evolution of modern industry, the capabilities devel-
oped within industry, and the efficiency with which these capabilities have
been utilized have been a major force in shaping the growth and economic
strength of modern nations (Chandler, 1993). The state-owned sector accounts
for a substantial part of employment and capital investment in many devel-
oped as well as developing nations. Therefore, understanding whether the
state-owned sector performs better or worse than private enterprises is rele-
vant in shedding light on whether national progress is being propelled for-
ward, at least sustained at a certain level, or impeded.3
The Indian experience with the state-owned sector provides a rich back-
drop for assessing comparative efficiency. In terms of magnitude, the state-
owned sector constitutes a large proportion of industrial activity, and for the
first four decades since independence the Indian economy has seen an ever-
increasing role played by state-owned enterprises. Jalan (1991) notes that
the total investments in Indian central government-owned enterprises were
Rs. 182,000 crores (Rs. 34 = $1; 100 crores = 1 billion) in 1990, made
up as fixed capital: Rs. 82,000 crores, working capital: Rs. 76,000 crores,
sundry investments: Rs. 11,000 crores and the deficit financed by the own-
ers: the government of India: Rs. 13,000 crores. These figures excluded the
assets of enterprises in the banking and insurance sectors, as well as those of
departmental undertakings such as railways, posts and a large portion of the
telecommunications network.
Table 1 gives an indication of the increasing role of the state-owned sec-
tor in India’s industrial economy. It shows the composition of employment,
productive capital (including fixed and working capital) and value added
between the state-owned sector (owned by the central government and the
governments of different states), the mixed sector and the private sector for
six recent time-periods: 1973–1974, 1976–1977, 1979–1980, 1982–1983,
1985–1986 and 1988–1989.
With respect to employment, the share of the state-owned and the mixed
sectors has risen, in total, from 27 percent in 1973–1974 to 37 percent in
1988–1989. With respect to productive capital invested, the share of the state-
owned and mixed sectors was over half, at 58 percent, in 1973–1974. By
1979–1980, this share had risen to 68 percent. Though fluctuations have
occurred, in 1988–1989 the share remained at 66 percent, implying that two-
thirds of the capital invested in Indian industry is owned by the state-owned
and mixed sectors.4
The paper evolves as follows. In Section 2 theory and evidence with respect
to performance assessment are discussed. Thereafter, in Section 3 the empir-
ical analyses are described. Data and estimation issues connected with the
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Table 1. Composition of employment and capital in the Indian
industrial sector: Trends over time
Year Sectoral composition Sectoral composition
of employment of capital employed
Private State Private State
1973–1974 0.73 0.27 0.42 0.58
1976–1977 0.70 0.30 0.36 0.64
1979–1980 0.68 0.32 0.32 0.68
1982–1983 0.66 0.34 0.32 0.68
1985–1986 0.63 0.37 0.37 0.63
1988–1989 0.61 0.39 0.34 0.66
paper are discussed. The analysis is based on a comparison of efficiency pat-
terns for sixteen time-periods between 1973–1974 and 1988–1989, which
is the last year for which data have been released by the Central Statistical
Organization of the Government of India, for four sectors of Indian indus-
try in respect of which data have been reported by ownership type. These
are: the central government-owned sector; the state government-owned sec-
tor; the mixed sector; and the private sector.5 Section 4 discusses the results
that are obtained from the empirical analyses, and Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2. Theory and evidence
2.1. Theory
Arguments advanced for the existence of performance differences between
private and government-owned enterprises are as follows. To the extent that
ownership composition varies, principal-agent issues arise (Putterman, 1993).
Property-rights over the enjoyment and disposal of assets are attenuated in
government-owned enterprises because a market for corporate control is absent.
Capitalization of future consequences into current share prices is inhibited,
leading to a reduction in owners’ incentives to monitor managers, and the
exit option that can be exercised where there is a market for corporate con-
trol is not viable. Consequently, there is a lack of capital market discipline to
which state-owned enterprise agent-managers can be subjected to by owner-
principals.
Next, an issue arises with respect to the fuzziness of owners’ identity. With
many owner-principals there are incentives to free-ride because any owner
bearing the costs of monitoring has to share them with others (Ben-Ner et al.,
1993). The ownership of state-owned enterprises is vested in individual gov-
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ernment departments. Theoretically, therefore, this attribute ought to ensure
superior performance, compared to the private sector, since ownership is not
diffused among many owners but there is only one owner who can exercise
strong control. However, the government department is, itself, an agency for
citizens who are the de-jure owners of state-owned enterprises. This means
that the control of government-owned enterprises, currently being undertaken
by civil servants, is vested in persons who are themselves agents monitoring
other agents, and have no incentives for carrying out their tasks.
The consequences can be as follows. As a collection of many principals,
citizens face severe agency problems. Citizens in a democracy have neither
the incentives, nor can they find it easy to control state-owned industrial
enterprise managers. Individually they cannot arrange a private portfolio of
state-funded enterprises, whereby the benefits of information acquired from
having undertaken monitoring activities can be internalized. Then, the very
diffuseness of public ownership implies that citizens acting individually have
small probabilities in influencing outcomes or expressing voice. As a result,
state-owned enterprises effectively become proprietary organizations owned
de-facto by civil servants or politicians, while managers in such organiza-
tions know that they are free of both market discipline or sanctions from the
ultimate principals.
In a related vein, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argue that it is primarily vari-
ations in the nature of competitive regimes faced that determine performance
differentials between privately and publicly-owned firms. There is some evi-
dence which finds that public and private firms facing similar competitive
environments do not display any efficiency differences (Caves and Chris-
tiansen, 1980), or that given sufficient competition between private and pub-
lic producers, and no discriminating regulations, unit cost differences are
insignificant (Borcherding et al., 1982). Nevertheless, in spite of similarities
in competitive conditions, the composition of the specific institutional envi-
ronments that private sector or public sector firms are faced with may affect
performance.
For example, there is the reality of the political environment surround-
ing government-owned enterprises. While citizens may have little say in the
functioning of government-owned firms, government decision-making is sur-
rounded by a constellation of interests forming specialized coalitions inter-
ested in government-enterprise operations. These actors include politicians,
unions, trade associations and consumer groups who can pressurize bureau-
crats into directing government-owned bodies into acting in manners consis-
tent with their own special interests. While the distributional consequences
of such pulls and pressures may often be positive, their impact on efficiency
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is likely to be negative because such factors do tend to make the management
process in government-owned enterprises complex and unfocussed.
2.2. Evidence
There is a large literature evaluating the relative performance of the public
versus the private sector. Boardman and Vining (1989) evaluate fifty-four
studies, of which six find the public sector to be more efficient, sixteen find
no performance differences between the two sectors, while thirty-two find
that the private sector is more efficient. Many of these studies have com-
pared firms undertaking specific activities, such as running airlines, supply-
ing water or supplying refuse collection services. However, comparatively
few studies have compared efficiency patterns among different ownership
segments of the industrial sector as a whole for a specific country.
There are some exceptions. Funkhouser and MacAvoy (1979) evaluate the
performance of a number of Indonesian public and private firms, operating in
different areas of the economy. Boardman and Vining (1989), in a compre-
hensive study, evaluate the performance of five-hundred of the world’s largest
corporations outside the United States for the year 1983. The companies they
evaluate operate in the mining and manufacturing sectors, and belong to sev-
eral nationalities. They find that, controlling for a variety of factors, mixed
and state-owned enterprises perform worse than similar private enterprises.
In terms of their key performance indicators, mixed enterprises are no differ-
ent from state-owned enterprises, but relatively worse performers compared
to the private sector firms.
With respect to India, three studies exist. These have used a variety of
methodologies, data and performance benchmarks. Bhaya (1990) uses Annu-
al Survey of Industries (ASI) data for the years 1981–1982 to 1985–1986.
Calculating simple ratios of net value added to fixed capital, working capital
and inventory, but ignoring human capital utilization, he believes it is safe to
conclude that public sector management efficiency is in no way inferior to
that of the private sector, but the sector does perform worse with respect to
its return on investment.
Jha and Sahni (1992) use ASI data for the years 1969–1961 to 1982–1983
for four industries: cement, cotton textiles, electricity and iron and steel. The
latter two industries, they claim, are primarily in the public sector, while the
first two are owned predominantly by private interests. The authors find no
evidence of allocative inefficiencies in general, and each of them are relative-
ly as efficient as one another. Ramaswamy and Renforth (1994) use 1988–
1989 to 1992–1993 accounting data for a non-randomly chosen and matched
sample of 55 firms each from the private and public sectors. Using the same
measures as Bhaya (1990), they conclude that managerial efficiency differ-
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ences do not exist between the two sectors, though public sector firms are
again found to be less profitable.
These studies contradict theory and belief with respect to public sector
performance. However, each study suffers from biases which call the results
into question. Bhaya (1990) uses very simplistic techniques, a narrow time-
window, and eye-balling procedures as analytical methodology to reach his
conclusions. Jha and Sahni (1992) are more rigorous, but restrict their study
to four sectors only. They also evaluate allocative efficiency, and no conclu-
sions with respect to technical or managerial efficiency can be made based
on their study. Ramaswamy and Renforth (1994) also have a narrow time-
window, their study suffers from the same methodological shortcomings as
the one by Bhaya (1990), and also from maximum sample-selection bias.
They non-randomly choose 55 firms each from the private and public sec-
tors, and, given the wide heterogeneity of private sector firms in India, it is
easy to choose a number of them which are similar to their public sector
counterparts in efficiency characteristics.
3. Emprical analyses
3.1. Data and context
To calculate comparative efficiency patterns over the period 1973–1974 to
1988–1989, data generated by the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) in India
are used. The ASI data relate to the organized sector of manufacturing indus-
try and have seen prior use (Ahluwalia, 1991). The factory sector summary
is used as the data-source for this study. From the data set, labor and capital
inputs as well as output measures can be identified.
The advantage of using this data is that information for the entire Indian
industry is available. This includes information on firms owned by the gov-
ernments of the various states in the Indian Union which are also substantial
players in the industrial arena, and whose performance has never been empir-
ically analyzed. The characteristic of this particular data-base is that data are
aggregate because of the reporting policies of the Department of Statistics
of the Government of India. However, the aggregation issue is unavoidable
since information on a key variable, that of firm-level employment, is just
not available for private sector firms. Hence, any comparative study of effi-
ciency has to use a data-base such as this. Aggregate data also helps avoid
any sample-selection biases, since data on the entire industrial population is
considered for comparative efficiency assessment purposes.
Since 1956, every conceivable sub-sector of Indian industry has seen their
presence of state-owned firms. Apart from defense firms, traditionally in
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the public domain, generation of atomic and non-atomic power, manufac-
ture of aircraft, heavy machinery, and equipment for rail and sea transport
are among activities carried out exclusively by state-owned firms. At present,
state-owned firms also manufacture products such as aluminium and non-
ferrous metals, chemical intermediates, iron and steel, drugs and fertilizers,
and are involved in diverse activities such as construction, engineering con-
sultancy, farming, handicrafts retailing, shipping, coal mining, oil refining,
commodity trading, and software consultancy. State-owned firms operate in
many consumer-goods industries such as condoms, hotels, handicraft retail-
ing, food products, televisions and consumer electronics where competition
among players is very high, and in general are subject to the same institu-
tional and regulatory forces that private firms have to face with regard to
day-to-day operations. Data for firms undertaking these activities are includ-
ed within the data that are analyzed.
Three inputs and one output are used in the computation of an efficiency
index for each observation. The inputs are rupee values of fixed and work-
ing capital, and the actual number of staff employed. The output variable is
net value added, expressed in crores of rupees (a crore is equal to ten mil-
lion) which is a standard measure of firm-level output (Jackson and Palmer,
1988). In the contemporary literature on efficiency measurement both value
added and gross output are concomitantly used to measure output. Howev-
er, Griliches and Ringstad (1971) advance arguments in favor of using value
added because it facilitates comparison of results for firms which may be het-
erogenous in material consumption. Second, inclusion of material as an input
may lead to the problem that all variation in efficiency may be captured by
materials consumption, thus obscuring the role of physical and human capital
utilization.
A further choice arises between the use of either gross or net value added
as the output measure. Denison (1974) makes a case for the use of net val-
ue added on theoretical grounds by arguing that, since gross value added
includes a measure of capital consumption, there is no rationale as to why
capital consumption ought to be maximized rather than minimized. Never-
theless, value added captures hybrid aspects of firms’ activities, as Diewert
(1978) has noted. First, it captures a production relationship between primary
factors and output. This relationship is based on managements’ capabilities.
Second, it also captures a profit-generating relationship between firm-specific
capital and firms’ output, which, while also dependent on endogenous man-
agement capabilities, is highly dependent on exogenous demand and supply
conditions, since these conditions determine the prices a firm is able to charge
for its outputs. In the context of state-owned firms in developing countries,
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administered price regimes may be in operation, and governments use state-
owned firms to operate as indirect tax collectors (Reddy, 1990). In the case
of India, this is particularly true for state-owned oil firms. Thus, there may be
a large element of windfall price-gains captured in the value added measure
for each firm.
To create value necessitates acquisition and configuration of capabilities,
which are encapsulated in physical, liquid and human capital. Capital inputs,
both physical and working capital, are also expressed in crores of rupees.
Human capital inputs are expressed in thousands of employees. To deflate
variables expressed in rupees the wholesale price index is used; the capital
inputs and the output values are then expressed in constant rupees.
Capital inputs can be book-values of physical capital given in ASI data,
however, in measuring capital input, the use of undeflated amounts lead to
inaccuracies. The book value series is deflated by a price index. The weak-
ness of the approach is that it does not take into account assets of different
vintages bought at different points of time. Conversely, major lacunae of the
perpetual inventory method, which can take into account the different-vintage
issue, are the two key assumptions, for some base year of an amount as begin-
ning capital stock, and an annual rate of capital consumption. Therefore, effi-
ciency parameters obtained by different researchers can vary amongst them-
selves, because each researcher may choose to base analysis of idiosyncratic
assumptions as to the base capital values and rate of capital consumption.
The ASI data reported by individual enterprises are collected at the factory
level. For public reporting purposes, data classified by ownership category
are released only in aggregate. Thus, for every year there are four observa-
tions with respect to output and inputs, given the existence of four ownership
categories. However, time-series observations for each ownership category
are available for each year between the period 1973–1974 to 1988–1989;
thus, for each category there are sixteen available observations. Pooling data
by ownership category and time yields sixty-four observations to be used
for comparative efficiency assessment. The ASI coverage and almost two
decades of time-series data yield rich information on the entire population of
enterprises that make up the organized industrial sector of India.6
The analyses involve calculating and comparing efficiency for the 16 years
between 1973–1974 and 1988–1989. For each year and each ownership cate-
gory an efficiency score is calculated, and to statistically assess performance
differences between various ownership categories, the scores for each cat-
egory are averaged for the sixteen-year period. Second, an issue is, have
there been efficiency gains over time? Fundamental economic liberalization
started in India in 1991. However, there were two spells of liberalization,
one starting after 1980 when the prime minister Mrs. Indira Ghandhi com-
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menced reforms, which her successor Mr. Rajiv Gandhi continued from 1985
onwards (Ahluwalia, 1991; Bhagwati, 1993). To test whether these had any
impact, the growth rates in efficiency scores obtained for each ownership
category are calculated.
3.2. Efficiency estimation
Data envelopment analysis (DEA)7 is used for estimation purposes. Using
observed output and input data, and without making any assumptions as to
the nature of underlying technology or functional form, the DEA algorithm
calculates an ex-post measure of the efficiency of each observation. This is
accomplished by constructing an empirically-based frontier, and by evaluat-
ing each observation against all others included in the data set.
Two main paradigms have evolved in the construction of frontier pro-
duction functions. There is the parametric approach, based on estimating
regression-driven production functions, and the non-parametric approach (DEA),
based on estimating linear programming models of the relative efficiency.
The advantage of the non-parametric approach is that it can handle multiple
outputs and multiple inputs. The data need not all be quantitative, and qualita-
tive measures can be used as outputs or inputs. Concomitantly, both nominal
and physical values can be simultaneously used as outputs or inputs, because
the aim is not to estimate functional parameters, per se, as in regression-based
efficiency estimation techniques, but relative measures of efficiency among
observations.
The advantage of DEA is in its approach. DEA optimizes for each indi-
vidual observation, in place of overall aggregation and single optimization
performed in statistical regressions. Instead of trying to fit a regression plane
through the center of the data, DEA floats a piece-wise linear surface to rest
on top of observations. This is empirically-driven by data, rather than by
assumptions as to functional forms. The only assumption made is that the
piece-wise linear envelopment surface is convex. Next, the efficiency score
is a bounded efficiency measure, and any observation with a score of less
than 1 has measurable potential for improvement.
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) [CCR] generalize a multiple output-
input measure of performance by means of a fractional mathematical pro-
gram were the ratio of the weighted outputs to weighted inputs (an efficiency
ratio) for each firm-level observation being evaluated is maximized. There
are a total of n observations being evaluated. The data used for each obser-
vation j (where j are the observations: j= 1; 2; :::k:::n) are as follows: each
observation consumes varying amounts of m different inpouts to produce s
different outputs. Specifically, observation j consumes Xj = fxijg of inputs
(i = 1; :::m) and produces amounts Yj = fyrjg of outputs (r= 1; :::s). It is
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assumed that xij > 0 and yrj > 0. The s n matrix of output measures is
denoted by Y and the m n matrix of input measures is denoted by X.
For the kth observation (among the j total observations) for which efficien-
cy is being evaluated, the objective of the empirical exercise is to maximize
the value of hk which is the ratio of outputs to inputs, and the values of u and








In the above expression, hk is a ratio measure of performance as to how effi-
cient each observation was with regard to converting a set of inputs jointly
and simultaneously into a set of outputs. For each kth observation, yrk are the
outputs which result from the conversion of xik inputs; ur and vi are weights
which are calculated as values to be assigned to each output and input in order
to maximize the efficiency rating, hk, of the observation being evaluated.8
Without any more constraints (1) is unbounded. Additional technological
constraints are introduced with respect to every other observation to reflect
the condition that the efficiency ratio be less than or equal to unity, or in other
words, no observation can be super-efficient. The mathematical programming
problem that results is:













vixij  1 (for j = 1;2; :::0; :::n) (3)
ur > 0 (for r = 1;2; :::s) (4)
vi > 0 (for i = 1;2; :::m) (5)
The constraint in (3) ensures that the ratio measure of performance is not
greater than one for any observation in the entire observation set, while the
constraints in (4) and (5) are positivity constraints and are strictly greater
than zero. (2) to (5) is a linear fractional programming problem, non-convex
and difficult to solve. To do so, the fractional program in (2) is translated
into a linear program using a transformation which involves computation of
two new variables: = uvXk and =
v
vXk
to make the linear fractional pro-
gramming problem a linear programming problem. The linear programming

















ixij  1 (j = 1;2; :::k; :::n) (8)
r > 0 (r = 1;2; :::s) (9)
i > 0 (i = 1;2; :::m) (10)
In (6), now wk is the objective function value for the observation being evalu-
ated, and is the efficiency score to be calculated for the kobservation being
evaluated. In the L.P. in (6) the weighted sum of outputs that can be obtained
is sought to be maximized, subject to the constraint that the weighted sum of
inputs equals unity in (7). (8) is a constraint postulating that outputs cannot
be less than inputs, and (9) and (10) are positivity constraints.
Each DEA model seeks to determine which subsets of the n observations
determine parts of an envelopment surface. In the L.P. formulation the opti-
mal value (optimal =) of wk is an efficiency indicator which measures the
distance a particular firm-level observation lies from the frontier. The kt
firm-level observation is efficient if wk = 1 in (6). This observation is ineffi-
cient if it does not lie on the frontier or wk < 1.
9 The optimization process in
(6) is repeated n times, once for each firm-level observation for which effi-
ciency is to be evaluated. That is, the L.P. is solved with(Xk;Yk) = (Xj ;Yj)
for j = 1;2; :::k; :::n. Each time the optimization is carried out data for oth-
er observations form part of the constraint set. The objective function val-
ues obtained partition the data-set into two parts: one consisting of efficient
observations and the other consisting of observations which are inefficient
and were wk < 1.
In extending the CCR model, Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) [BCC]
show that the CCR efficiency score can be broken up into measures of scale
efficiency, and pure technical efficiency given the scale of operations each
observation is presently at. This is achieved by assuming that variable returns
to scale exist, and adding a variable~uk in the objective function in (6). The
result of adding this variable is that hyperplanes for each observation do not
pass through the origin, unlike in the CCR model where all hyperplanes go
through the origin because constant returns to scale are assumed. In the con-
straint set, this variable is unconstrained in that it can take on values which
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are negative (increasing returns to scale exist), or 0 (constant returns to scale
exist) or positive (decreasing returns to scale exist) for each kth observation.
3.3. Efficiency growth rates
To calculate efficiency growth rates, an exponential efficiency-time relation
is initially specified, as follows:
Et = x(1+ r)tt (11)
which can be linearized as follows:
Ln Et = a+ bt+ ut (12)
where Et = an efficiency ratio generated by the DEA program for each sector
and time-period.
t = time in discrete years (t = 1:::16);
a = ln x = a constant;
r = annual compound growth rate;
b = ln(1+ r)
ut = lnt  ind(0; 2)
The exponential form is chosen for the following reason. If progress is
assumed to be dynamic, then efficiency in a given year is more likely to be
at least a constant percentage of efficiency in the previous year and not a
constantly diminishing percentage of it. The coefficient on time, b, is the
continuous rate of growth, but given the range of values it closely approxi-
mates the annual compound growth rate, and the estimates of b are taken as
the growth rates. A basic problem which arises in the fitting of equation (12)
to the full time-series data is that the growth rate in a given period can differ
from the growth rates of efficiency in the various sub-periods. The estimated
growth rates in efficiency in each period can be higher or lower than that of
the entire period, depending on the nature of policy regimes in place. Thus,
sub-period growth rates in efficiency are estimated for the years: 1973–1980
and 1981–1988 separately.
The variations in growth rates shown by estimates of equation (11) raise
an issue as to whether these rates are constant. Efficiency growth rates can
accelerate or decelerate. To incorporate such possibilities and evaluate the
rate of change in efficiency for the full period as well as for the two sub-
periods, a log-quadratic equation is estimated, as follows:




A significantly positive value of c indicates an acceleration in the growth rate
of efficiency; a significantly negative value indicates deceleration.
The inclusion of time squares on the right-hand side in (13) introduces a
multi-collinearity problem. This is solved by normalizing time in mean devi-
ation form. That is, it is set to zero on the mid-point of the time series. This
procedure is followed for the full series as well as for each of the two sub-
periods. This normalization makes time and its square orthogonal. The nor-
malization of time only affects b. The estimate of c and its standard error are
invariant with respect to the normalization. In the log-quadratic estimation,
the value of b is the same as in the log-linear model. The standard error of b is
the measure of instability of the growth rate of efficiency. If it is assumed that
the log-quadratic form is a better estimator of the true trends in the growth
rate of efficiency, the instability measure of b is also improved, since system-
atic specification errors are cleansed from the data.
4. Results
4.1. Comparative efficiency patterns
The BCC DEA algorithm, which makes no assumptions as to the returns to
scale characteristics of the different observations, is used to calculate relative
efficiency scores. The detailed scores for each ownership category by each
year are given in Table 2. The descriptive statistics of the scores are given in
Table 3, and form the basis of the subsequent discussion.
The sectors of Indian industry owned by the central government and the
governments of the various Indian states have average efficiency scores of
0.658 and 0.638, on a scale of 0 to 1, respectively for the period between
1973–1974 and 1988–1989. Comparatively, the sector of Indian industry
owned jointly by a combination of government and private owners has a
score of 0.912. The privately-owned segment of Indian industry has a score
of 0.975 for the same period. It is reiterated that these are comparative scores
only. If data for later years are used, the resultant average scores may very
well change. If a sector, say the mixed enterprise sector, is dropped from the
computations, again the relative scores may very well change.
Prima facie, the results reveal that government-owned firms are less effi-
cient than firms in the mixed or the private sector. The data also reveal that
in the Indian context mixed sector firms are more efficient than government-
owned firms, but less efficient than those in the private sector, while the pri-
vate sector is comparatively the most efficient sector of Indian industry. The
variation in the patterns of DEA-derived scores are also of interest. The cen-
tral and state government sectors have considerably higher variation in their
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Table 2. Efficiency scores for four sectors of Indian industry:
Computations for the years 1973–1974 to 1988–1989
Central State Joint Private
government government sector sector
sector sector
1973–74 0.596 0.656 1.000 0.908
1974–75 0.746 0.474 1.000 1.000
1975–76 0.597 0.676 0.922 0.866
1976–77 0.613 0.256 0.815 0.952
1977–78 0.544 0.582 0.912 0.959
1978–79 0.483 0.726 0.888 1.000
1979–80 0.466 0.498 0.757 1.000
1980–81 0.474 0.447 0.731 1.000
1981–82 0.608 0.579 0.857 0.988
1982–83 0.671 0.620 0.888 0.952
1983–84 0.525 0.762 0.954 1.000
1984–85 0.555 0.657 1.000 1.000
1985–86 0.879 0.892 0.925 1.000
1986–87 0.819 0.976 0.984 0.998
1987–88 0.951 0.618 0.962 0.969
1988–89 1.000 0.787 1.000 1.000
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores: 1973 to 1988
Parameter Central State Joint Private
government government sector sector
Mean 0.658 0.638 0.912 0.975
Standard deviation 0.171 0.176 0.086 0.039
Coefficient of variation 0.260 0.275 0.094 0.045
Maximum 1.000 0.976 1.000 1.000
75% tile 0.782 0.744 0.992 1.000
Median 0.602 0.638 0.924 0.999
25% tile 0.534 0.538 0.872 0.956
Minimum 0.466 0.256 0.731 0.866
Range 0.534 0.720 0.269 0.134
Inter-quartile deviation 0.248 0.205 0.120 0.044
efficiency scores as compared to the mixed and private sectors. The stan-
dard deviation (coefficient of variation) of the scores are 0.171 (0.260) and
0.176 (0.275) respectively, compared to standard deviations (and coefficients
of variations) of 0.086 (0.094) and 0.039 (0.045) for the mixed and private
sectors.
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Data on the maximum, 75th percentile, median 25th percentile and mini-
mum scores are given, and the range and the inter-quartile deviations for the
four sectors reveal the existence of considerable variation in the scores for
the central and state governments-owned portions of Indian industry. While
the mixed sector scores do not vary as much as those for the government sec-
tors, they do vary more than the scores for the private sectors. The data show
that the range and inter-quartile deviation of the score for the mixed sector,
at 0.269 and 0.120 respectively, are higher than those of the private sector
which are 0.134 and 0.044.
The greater variation noted in the scores for the government-owned sectors
has a key implication. While the average efficency of the government-owned
sector is lower than that of the mixed or private sectors, the scores have fluc-
tuated considerably, suggesting that performance of state-owned enterprises
has been relatively volatile. A glance at Table 3 reveals that the efficiency
scores for the central government-owned sector were around the 0.5 mark
during much of the seventies and early eighties, but rose considerably after
1985–1986. It is feasible that after the installation of Rajiv Gandhi’s govern-
ment in late 1984 the liberalization that was undertaken had some impact, and
this shows up in the higher scores for the last four years in the present data-
set. Comparatively, the portion of Indian industry owned by the state govern-
ments, prima facie, shows no discernable pattern in its efficiency scores for
the sixteen years studied.
Table 4 presents the results of a statistical test carried out to evaluate
whether the average efficiency score for each ownership category differ sig-
nificantly from each other. The non-parametric procedure carried out is the
one suggested by Wilcoxon (1945).
As shown in Table 4, statistically there is no difference between the effi-
ciency of the central government-owned sector and that part of Indian indus-
try owned by the various state governments, and the Wilcoxon z statistic
comparing differences in average scores is almost negligible (with a p value
almost unity at 0.96). The central government-owned sector is statistically
higher inefficient than both the joint sector and the private sector (with the
associated p values being 0.00). Similarly, the sector owned by the state gov-
ernments is also statistically less efficient than either the joint or the private
sectors (again p values are 0.00). Finally, the joint sector is also significantly
less efficient than the private sector. However, while the efficiency difference
is statistically significant, the significance is not as strong (the p value is 0.02)
as it was with respect to efficiency differences between the central or state-
government-owned sectors and the joint or private sectors.
It has been remarked that in the post-1980 period industrial reforms started
taking place in India. Differences in scores for each ownership category are
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Table 4. Non-parametric test results comparing pair-wise effi-
ciency scores among the different sectors




Central government sector 0.00 3.41 3.41
(0.96) (0.00) (0.00)




Note.The test compares whether the row efficiency score is sig-
nificantly less than the column efficiency score. The upper num-
ber in each cell is the Wilcoxon test z value. The lower number,
in parentheses, is p value.
Table 5. Non-parametric test results comparing pair-wise effi-
ciency scores among the different sectors




Central government sector 0.00 2.52 2.52
(1.00) (0.01) (0.01)




Note.The test compares whether the row efficiency score is sig-
nificantly less than the column efficiency score. The upper num-
ber in each cell is the Wilcoxon test z value. The lower number,
in parentheses, is the p value.
separately tested for the years 1973 to 1980 and 1981 to 1988 respectively to
identify if the pattern of differences noted for the overall period stay the same
in two sub-periods, one of which is pre-reforms and the other post-reforms.
The results are given in Table 5 and 6.
The test results establish that for both periods, 1973 to 1980 and 1981
to 1988, the private sector is more efficient than any other sector. The joint
sector is more efficient than the government-owned sectors, while being less
efficient that the private sector. The government-owned sectors are made up
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Table 6. Non-parametric test results comparing pair-wise effi-
ciency scores among the different sectors




Central government sector 0.14 2.10 2.19
(0.88) (0.04) (0.03)




Note.The test compares whether the row efficiency score is sig-
nificantly less than the column efficiency score. The upper num-
ber in each cell is the Wilcoxon test z value. The lower number,
in parentheses, is the p value.
of the central government-owned and state government-owned enterprises,
and between themselves there are no performance differences in either of the
two sub-periods.
4.2. Efficiency growth rates
The results point out that the private sector is more efficient in the Indian
context, for the period studied as a whole as well for two sub-periods. Growth
rate estimations help establish whether there is time-wise increase in sectoral
efficiency patterns. Estimates are in Table 7.
In the period 1973 to 1988, central government enterprises’ efficiency has
grown at the rate of 2 percent and the efficiency of those owned by state-
governments at 3.45 percent per annum, respectively. Both trends are signifi-
cant; however, an accelerative pattern is noted for the central government-
owned sector. Joint sector efficiency has not risen or fallen significantly,
while that of the private sector has grown at a rate of 0.47 percent per annum,
a trend which is significant. A review of the results for the two separate time-
periods reveals interesting dynamics at work. For the period 1973 to 1980,
efficiency declined at the rate of 9.1 percent per annum, 1.67 percent per
annum and 4.27 percent per annum for the central government-owned, state
governments-owned and mixed-sector enterprises, the trends being signifi-
cant for the central government-owned and the mixed sectors. Private sector
efficiency rose at the rate of 1.33 percent per annum. Between 1981 and 1988,
central and state-government-owned enterprises’ efficiency rose at the rate of
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Table 7. Sectoral percent growth rates in efficiency over time
Central State Mixed Private
government Government sector sector
sector sector
Overall period: 1973 to 1988
Growth rate (+/-) 2.00 3.45 -0.10 0.47
(2.04) (2.25) (0.21) (2.41)
Acceleration (+)/ 1.20 0.29 0.29 -0.07
Deceleration (-) (4.97) (0.80) (2.59) (1.38)
Period 1: 1973 to 1980
Growth Rate (+/-) -9.10 -1.67 -4.27 1.33
(2.98) (0.28) (4.25) (1.70)
Acceleration (+)/ -0.62 0.96 -0.23 0.12
Deceleration (-) (0.41) (0.32) (0.46) (0.32)
Period 2: 1981 to 1988
Growth rate (+/-) 10.78 3.78 0.72 0.20
(3.92) (1.46) (0.58) (0.63)
Acceleration (+)/ 1.49 -1.72 0.02 -0.01
Deceleratin (-) (1.08) (1.36) (0.03) (0.60)
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses; p ¡ .05 and p ¡ .10 (one-tailed).
10.78 and 3.78 percent per annum respectively, while the mixed sector and
private sector efficiency rose at 0.72 and 0.20 percent per annum respectively.
There are several implications of the rising trends in the efficiency of the
central government-owned sector. From the early 1980s, several industrial-
sectors reforms were commenced, and the public sector was made the target
of policy makers’ critical attention. In the mid-1980s, a committee headed
by Dr. Arjun Sengupta, then economic adviser in the prime minister’s office,
recommended several far-reaching changes in public sector management and
control practices. These were being implemented, albeit slowly, over the lat-
ter part of the 1980s and the improvements in efficiency bear out that they
have had some impact in making the public sector more efficient than it had
been, relative to its own base.
4.3. Discussion of results
The state-owned and the mixed sectors account for two-thirds of contempo-
rary capital investment in India, but are significantly inefficient compared to
the private sector. If there has been a retrogression in India’s industrial capa-
bilities up to the 1980s, as authors (Ahluwalia, 1991; Bhagwati, 1993) have
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suggested, then the analyses carried out suggest that the government-owned
sector must bear a great deal of the blame. The mixed sector, however, is
significantly efficient compared to the state-owned sector, and in India is an
important player in the industrial arena. The joint sector consists principally
of petroleum firms. Their performance helps to redress the situation towards
ensuring the efficient use of public resources.
The results obtained have several implications from the point of view of
theory. Recollect that the DEA score calculated using the BCC algorithm
is a precise measure of efficiency for each observation. In comparison with
the private sector, which is almost fully-efficient in a relative sense, because
the average score is 0.975 on a scale of 0 to 1, government-owned firms are
just about two-thirds as efficient, and these efficiency differences are strongly
significant. Ownerhsip does strongly matter in influencing industrial perfor-
mance in the Indian context.
Efficient resource utilization helps generate surpluses, which can be rein-
vested towards the creation of further resources. Hence, improvements in
efficiency have an impact on the future productivity capabilities of nations
by providing higher levels of reinvestible surplus. For example, Jones (1991)
indicates that a 5 percent increase in the efficiency of state-owned enterprises,
without any changes in prices or investment, would result in freeing resources
of about 5 percent of GDP in Egypt, or reduce 50 percent of direct taxes in
Pakistan, or fund a 150 percent increase in government expenditures on edu-
cation, health, culture and science in China. The release of a similar quantity
of resources can transform Indian industrial performance.
There are some possible explanations as to why state-owned entities show
lower efficiency. They have been prey to inappropriate location and tech-
nology choice decisions, irrational product mixes, and imposed marketing
arrangements. These decisions have been made for political considerations,
and have not been based on economic criteria (Bardhan, 1984; Bhagwati,
1993). As a result, few choices and incentives are given to managers to
maximize economic residue, and neither are they accountable for attain-
ing efficiency because ambiguous and non-economic objectives have driven
decision-making. For example, in the Indian context these socio-economic
objectives include the promotion of income and wealth redistribution, cre-
ation of employment, promotion of regions, promotion of import substitu-
tion, and being “model employers” (Marathe, 1989). Also, in the Indian con-
text state-owned enterprises have been used to implement government policy
with regard to stabilizing commodity trade, or in making transfer payments
to various specific sections of the community (Jalan, 1991).
However, other key reasons as to why government-owned enterprises are
likely to be less efficient relate to the type of monitoring managers in these
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enterprises are subject to. In the Indian context, government-owned enter-
prises are subject to the detailed oversight of the parent departments, as well
as legislative oversight by committees on public undertakings of the cen-
tral and states’ legislatures. Therefore, the issue of ownership diffuseness is
not a problem. Yet, enforcement of legislative committee findings does not
take place (Chaudhuri, 1994; Marathe, 1989), and the disciplining hand of
the capital market is also absent. Consequently, attaining efficiency is not a
primary managerial motivation in the government-owned sector.
Second, the identity of owners is a factor arising from which government-
owned enterprise managers tend to become agents without principals.
Controlling-department bureaucrats, then, become de-facto owners of such
government enterprises. However, a major phenomenon to emerge in India
is that of state-legitimized rent-seeking which has an extremely enervating
effect on efficiency (Bardhan, 1984). For example, often the creation of
government-owned enterprises has been driven not by ideological or prag-
matic reasons, but to create extra-pecuniary opportunities for senior civil ser-
vants or politicians (Chaudhuri, 1994).
For example, Marathe (1989: 184) quotes Mr. B.K. Nehru, a former ambas-
sador of India to the United States, who has also held several key appoint-
ments in economic spheres, “It is simply that it has become common prac-
tice for public sector enterprises, particularly in the States, to be made into
mechanisms to provide powerful politicians, who cannot be accommodat-
ed as Ministers, with salaries, perquisites, patronage and opportunities to
make money through corruption.” Bardhan (1984: 69–70) also writes “Senior
appointments in the public sector are sometimes made more on the basis of
political patronage than of merit (leading often to low morale in the ranks
of the technocracy in the enterprises). Headships of public sector units, par-
ticularly under the State Governments, are indiscriminately used as politi-
cal sinecures. Efficient managers who fail to satisfy the Minister’s political
clients are often arbitrarily transferred.” The impact of such phenomenon is
to create a cadre of managers in the public sector who are agents without
principles.
Some authors (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) have argued that, given differ-
ences in ownership structures, the nature of competitive conditions faced is
a key factor in eliminating efficiency differences between enterprises. The
data, however, do establish that given a similar competitive playing field,
institutional influences felt by the owners do matter in impacting perfor-
mance in India. Such evidence is contrary to what has been established in the
West (Caves and Christiansen, 1980; Borcherding, Pommerehne, and Schnei-
der, 1982). However, public sector management reforms have also had some
impact, as shown by the significantly increasing trend in efficiency of the
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government-owned sector in the 1981 to 1988 period. Therefore, in the Indi-
an case it is not only necessary to continue with the major liberalization to
encourage industrial growth, but also to undertake speedy re-structuring of
public sector management and control practices so as to realize efficiency
gains.
The key limitation of the study has to be discussed. It is with respect to the
data used. While it can be concluded in the aggregate that government-owned
firms consume a greater quantity of inputs, relative to private firms, in gen-
erating value added, finer analysis has not been possible. Within the data for
each sector, say the central government-owned sector or the private sector, are
contained information on firms belonging to several different types of indus-
tries. Data of finer granularity may reveal the specific industries in which
state-owned firms excel, or are particularly inefficient. However, while key
micro-level information may be available for one sector, such information is
not generally available for other sectors. Therefore, comparative efficiency
assessment has been feasible at an aggregate level of analysis.
5. Conclusion
In this paper efficiency differences between government-owned, mixed sector
and private sector enterprises in India were evaluated. Using data and basing
the performance analyses for the entire Indian industrial sector, enterprises
owned by the central government and the governments of various states are
found to be systematically less efficient than either mixed or private sector
enterprises, while mixed sector enterprises are less efficient than those in
the private sector. The analyses reveal that the assumptions of theory, posit-
ing higher efficiency levels for the private sector, cannot be disproved in the
Indian context, and contradict all extant comparative evidence (Bhaya, 1990;
Jha and Sahni, 1992; Ramaswamy and Renforth, 1994) which have found no
sectoral performance differences. Government-owned enterprises are major
players in the industrial arena and the results obtained provide indication that
they may be, in major part, responsible for India’s lack-lustre industrial per-
formance.
Notes
1. The demise of command-style economies is already being attributed to behavioral issues
that arise when government is the primary owner of enterprises (Roemer, 1993). Based on
this premise, major reforms are taking place in most erstwhile command economies, and
there is an explicit acknowledgement that private ownership will yield greater efficiencies
and breed industrial success.
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2. In India contributors to the equity capital of enterprises include the central government,
governments of the various states in the Indian Union, private investors and governments
jointly, and private investors alone. The primary way to distinguish between ownership
categories is to classify them as the state-owned (public) and the private sectors. The
term state-owned is used in the Indian context to include enterprises owned both by the
central government and by the governments of the various states that form part of the
Indian Union. The latter are called state government-owned enterprises. In subsequent
empirical analysis, central government-owned and state government-owned enterprises’
data are separated for efficiency estimation purposes. Though the termnterprisesis used
throughout the paper, analysis is carried out using aggregate data, as described in a later
section of the paper.
3. It is argued that the comparative assessment of state-owned enterprises with other types of
enterprises is not feasible because profitability review of state-owned enterprises ignores
the socio-economic objectives associated with state-owned enterprises (Bhaya, 1990). Yet,
for a fundamental reason, comparative efficiency analysis matters. Industrial progress is
determined not only by the rate of expansion of resources employed, but by the way
resources have been utilized and efficiency in resource utilization is well-acknowledged
shown to be more critical to economic welfare than allocative efficiencies.
4. Marathe (1989) notes how there were less than five central government-owned enterprises
in 1950–1951. Ten years later there were forty eight. By 1971–1972 there were over a
hundred such enterprises and by 1980–1981 the number had increased to one hundred
and eighty seven. Currently, there are almost two hundred and fifty such enterprises.
5. Data are collected for factories belonging to firms in each of these sectors, and the factory-
level data are aggregated for reporting purposes annually. The data-reporting and collec-
tion is carried out under the framework of the Indian Collection of Statistics Act of 1953
by the Department of Statistics in the Ministry of Planning.
6. The Annual Survey of Industries has been carried out since 1959, and is the principal
source of industrial statistics in India. The ASI extends to every part of the country, except
some industrially-marginal states, and covers all factories registered under the Indian Fac-
tories Act of 1948. Essentially, all factories employing more than 10 workers and using
power, or more than 20 workers and not using power have to report data. However, the
ASI was not carried out for 1972–1973, and data prior to that year are not available in
collated form by ownership category.
7. Theoretical details with respect to data envelopment analysis can be found in Seiford and
Thrall (1990).
8. The DEA procedure takes each observation into account in the computation of its relative
efficiency score. The set of weights(ur; vi) are implicit internal valuation schemes which
are empirically determined by the algorithm, and may vary from observation to obser-
vation. This is based on a determination of which of the inputs a particular observation
is particularly adept at in utilizing, or which of the outputs it is particularly adept at in
generating, based on data. By assigning high weights to those inputs and output variables
which an observation seems to be more adept at in utilizing, or in generating, and low
weights to others, the algorithm attempts to maximize the observed performance of each
observation in light of its revealed attributes.
9. In a DEA model, observations which attain a score of 1, on a scale of 0 to 1, are efficient.
Observations scoring less than 1 are inefficient, based on the definition of efficiency which
is the extraction of all possible output with given inputs. A DEA efficiency score provides
a first-order indication of efficiency differences. If all observations come from the same
environment, then if data are classified according to ownership, conclusions as to whether
the ownership categories differ from others in efficiency can be drawn. Subsequently,
second-order explanations as to whether such efficiency differences arise because of tech-
nical change, or other endogenous reasons, can be obtained by regressing DEA-generated
scores on appropriate regressors.
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